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Looking in the Right Place:   Complexity Theory, 
Psychoanalysis and Infant Observation.1 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
 
After over fifty years of the practice of Esther Bick’s model of infant 
observation, there surely cannot be too much doubt about what is supposed 
to be observed in this  setting. Esther Bick (1964) herself described the 
purposes of introducing infant observation into the curriculum of child 
psychotherapists as  to ‘help students to conceive vividly  the infantile 
experience of their child patients.’  She refers also to ‘the student’s 
understanding of the child’s non-verbal behaviour,’ and to the student’s 
‘unique opportunity to observe the development  of an infant more or less 
from birth, and in his home setting and in his relation to his immediate family, 
and thus to find out for himself  how these relations emerge.’   
This is, in descriptive terms, clear enough, and has been a good enough 
guide to the educational purposes of  infant observation.   But when one 
thinks of infant observation as a resource for  generating new ideas and 
understandings in psychoanalysis -  that is for research-  it says rather little.  
For this purpose, a more theoretical discussion of the kinds of data and 
experience  that infant observation can provide, and how these relate to the 
development of psychoanalytic theory, is necessary.  I have explored these 
issues in two previous papers, (Rustin 1989 and 1997),  and in this one, 
drawing on the writings of both Bick and  Bion, I add some additional 
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dimensions.  I will  draw attention to some interesting parallels between the 
modelling and mapping devices developed in recent work in Complexity 
Theory and Chaos Theory (originating in mathematics, but now with 
broadening applications to empirical sciences), and psychoanalytic method, 
and then suggest how these are relevant to infant observation too. I shall be 
suggesting that Bion, and in more implicit way Bick, anticipated the ways of 
thinking of Complexity Theory, from their very different psychoanalytic starting 
point, by about twenty years. 
There is an unavoidably abstract and meta-theoretical aspect to these 
research questions, which involve the definition of our underlying objects of 
study.  What kinds of meaning are we looking for in clinical and observational 
studies? Are they  the kinds of regularities which are summarised in scientific 
laws, defining relations of cause and effect?  Can they be generalised 
between instances?  Can empirical evidence be found for such correlations 
as we identify?   Or are the links between phenomena that we see  merely 
relations of logical coherence and consistency, -  what we think of as the 
subjective meaning of an action or a state of mind, when we understand how 
states of feeling, desire and belief are connected to one another?   For 
example, we may understand an envious personality as one which is 
dominated by a  pervasive  (perhaps largely unconscious) disposition or 
feeling, which gives meaning and coherence to various particular  beliefs and 
actions of the subject.   
Psychoanalytic explanation tends to waver between these different poles of 
cause and meaning. It needs  the dimension of subjective and unconscious 
meaning to give any sense at all to its work, but also finds it difficult to do 
without some idea of causal connection or law-like relationship, to the 
discovery and accumulation of which of course Freud was in particular 
dedicated.   Different research programmes in psychoanalysis and its 
adjacent fields are shaped by these different polarities. The  advocates of 
‘empirical research’ in psychoanalysis seek to make psychoanalysis more 
compatible with ‘scientific’ methods in which valid and reliable measures of 
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 This is the complete  version of a paper presented at  the Conference 'Frontiers of Practice 
2: The New Dialogue between Attachment Theory and British Object Relations', Bellevue WA.   
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causal relations are fundamental. Those on the contrary committed to clinical 
methods tend to stay closer to the dimensions of subjective meaning, and to 
the individual case-studies  in which these are most vividly  manifested.   The 
methodological difficulty for the latter is in finding systematic ways of 
generalising from individual instances. The methodological  difficulty for the 
former is to avoid such flattening out of individual differences, and of  the 
sheer complexity of psychic phenomena, in their search for verifiable laws, 
that they move far away from a psychoanalytic understanding.2     
This polar opposition between dimensions of causality and meaning has long 
divided studies  in the  sciences, which once seemed to be unambiguously  
concerned with causality, from those in the humanities, which seemed largely 
concerned with meanings.  The ‘human sciences’ have sat uncomfortably in 
the middle of the division, some of them (such as psychology and economics) 
aiming to be as science-like as possible, whilst others, more preoccupied with 
dimensions of  culture, such as anthropology and some branches of 
sociology, have  given more weight to description - ‘thick description’, as 
Clifford Geertz (1973) called it -  over causal explanation, as the only way  
truthfully to render the complexity and contingency of human experience.  
Psychoanalysis has largely located itself on the subjective and meaningful 
end of this continuum. Kant’s philosophical distinctions between the causally-
determined world of nature, and the human domain of freedom and self-
generated order  have long provided an underlying metaphysical framing for 
this polarity of approaches.3  
 
The persistence and intractability of this opposition might suggest however 
that the problems have been hitherto framed in  a misleading way.  This  
seems especially suggested by the fact that in the human sciences both  
                                            
2
 Reflections on the relevance of complexity theory to the debate on evidence-based 
psychotherapy are in Robinson (2002). On the broader issues of evidence, see Rustin 
(2001b).  
3
  The development of complexity theory, and its implications for psychoanalysis, to some 
degree however match Kant's own  resolution of this antithesis so far as human understanding 
is concerned, in his own account of the order-creating capacities of the human mind, in The 
Critique of Judgement.  The post-Kleinian emphasis on the functions of mind and on the 
aesthetic sense as a manifestation of this has affinities with the argument of the Critique of 
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sides in this argument have often sought to overcome the limitations of their 
partial position by incorporating some of the insights of their antagonists.  
‘Causal’ approaches try to introduce a dimension of meaning, for example by 
defining ‘meanings’ and intentions as a particular kind of cause.  Approaches 
focusing on meaning nevertheless identify developmental patterns, and  self-
maintaining ‘systems’ or kinds of order, which seem to advance weak but 
unmistakable assertions of causal connection.  Perhaps there might be 
another  way of formulating the issues that can go beyond such pragmatic 
compromises between  approaches, into a more adequate formulation of 
what  ‘binds’ human actions together. 
 
Complexity Theory 
I suggest we might find the more adequate formulations we need in the field 
of ideas known as ‘Complexity Theory’ and ‘Chaos Theory’,4 (Ruelle 1991,  
Gleick 1998, Prigogine and Stengers 1984, Stewart 1990,  Prigogine 1996, 
Gell-Mann 1994, Kauffman 1995) which is just  beginning to have a 
substantial impact on the human sciences (Byrne 1998, Thrift 1999, Eve, 
Horsfall and Lee 1997), and on the ways in which scientific explanations are 
framed. 5 
In the last  twenty or so years, a major field of inquiry has developed around 
the significance  in the natural, biological, and social sciences, of complex 
self-organising systems. The properties of these systems  are not explicable 
or predictable by reference to models of linear causation. Of  particular 
                                                                                                                             
Judgement, as both Likierman (1989) and Rustin (1991c)  have pointed out in their 
discussions of psychoanalytic aesthetics.   
4
 Chaos theory, developed initially by mathematicians, and physical scientists, sought to 
investigate unexpected properties of order in apparently chaotic or random environments.  
'Complexity theory' emerged subsequently  from this, among scientists interested mainly in  
self-organising biological systems. A literal and metaphorical boundary between these two 
overlapping frames of reference is the concept of 'the edge of chaos',  One hypothesis, 
developed through computer modelling of various evolutionary processes, is that the 'edge of 
chaos' provides the optimal environment for development. 'It is as though a position in the 
ordered regime near the transition to chaos affords the best mixture of stability and flexibility.'  
(Kauffman 1995, p. 91). Complexity theory became something of a social movement, its 
methodological holism, and its idea that order could be discerned in turbulent environments, 
giving a meta-theoretical backing  to the idea of  'sustainability'.  For a brief account of this 
social dimension, see Waldrop (1992) chapter 9.   
 5
interest within this paradigm are changes from one ordered systemic state to 
another, and the role of contingencies  in bringing such changes about. They  
involve time-irreversible processes, and are not neutral with respect to time as 
have been the models of both classical and quantum physics. They have the 
attribute that small changes in initial conditions can generate very large 
divergences in systemic outcomes (the famous ‘butterfly effect’; in which the 
fluttering of the wings of a butterfly in the Amazon rain forest could in theory  
have major effects on a weather system in the United States). These 
systematic organisations show a tendency for ‘bifurcation’,  such that from a 
single starting point alternative structured outcomes are possible. Finally,  
there is a tendency for coherence and cohesion within such systems,  which 
is explained by what are described in an extraordinarily resonant metaphor as 
‘strange attractors’.6  ‘Strange attractors’ describe the forces for cohesion and 
order in multi-dimensional systems whose states cannot be explained as the 
outcome of linear causal principles. One analogy used in this literature to 
make sense of  ‘attractors’ is that of neighbouring river basins, into  one or 
other of which all the drainage of a locality must flow.   
This paradigm identifies and explores a new kind of order, intermediate 
between the deterministic order of classical physics, and the spheres of the 
apparently random and unpredictable.  ‘Chaos’, as defined within ‘chaos 
theory’, is not chaos or randomness as this is understood in commonsense 
terms, but has its own different ordering principles, marked by major 
transitions, bifurcations of development, multi-dimensional causality, 
‘emergent properties’; which are the outcome of interactions between entities 
within systems, and of time-irreversible evolutionary patterns.  The 
assumptions of constancy, determinism, and equilibrium, which underlay 
previously conventional scientific paradigms, are replaced by the idea of 
evolution, partial uncertainty, and disequilibrium. The earlier assumptions 
(e.g. of classical physics) remain valid within the assumption of ‘closed 
systems’.  However, it is  argued that the existence of closed systems cannot 
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 A useful overview of this field is Mark C. Taylor (2001) The Moment of Complexity: Emerging 
Network Culture. 
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be presupposed.  (It is surely certain that human personality and social 
systems never have the attributes of closed systems.) Quantum theory also 
suggests that at micro-levels a principle of indeterminacy holds (Heisenberg’s 
‘uncertainty principle’ being one famous version of this). This suggests that 
the actual world which we know through our ‘coarse grained’ modelling is only 
one possible world of the many that might have eventuated from the 
properties of nature.  This is a fortiori true of biological evolution, and of 
course of the evolution of culture and society, where there is no reason to 
presuppose a law-like determination of one predestined present or future.7  
Psychoanalysis is predicated on the assumption that for individuals different 
potential worlds  can be imagined and realised given self-understanding. It is 
to make visible and possible such alternative worlds that individuals enter 
psychotherapy.  
This argument for necessary contingency does not depend, as in some 
interpretations of quantum physics, on the uncertainties imparted by the place 
of the observer in any process of measurement.  (It is this idea which has 
linked the theory of relativity to the idea of ‘relativism’  or observation-
dependent understanding, in science8). Instead uncertainty and 
unpredictability is deemed to be an attribute of reality itself (Prigogine 1996, 
Gell-Mann 1994).    Organisms, and complex organisms like human life in 
particular, exhibit these states of unpredictability, emergent properties, and 
the   common ‘bifurcation’ of evolutionary paths, to an even greater degree 
than the physical universe, though within the framing of chaos theory they are 
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  Quinodoz (1999) writes that  Ruelle, the originator of the 'strange attractor'  concept, 
described his expression as 'psychoanalytically suggestive'.  Indeed, what attractors could be 
stranger than those that are unconscious?  
7
 Attempts, such as those of some forms of Marxism, to posit deterministic laws of history, 
have come to seem very fallible in contemporary 'post-modern' times.  
8
  The psychoanalytic process involves complications of this kind, since plainly the observed 
(the patient) is influenced by the process of observation (by the analyst) in very substantial 
ways. For Grunbaum (1984, 1993) this 'observer-effect', or the suggestibility of the patient,  is 
the fatal flaw in  psychoanalytic claims to generate knowledge.   Psychoanalytic method tries 
to deal with this problem in various ways. Perhaps its most fundamental is the contention of 
object-relations theory that mental life is always organised in an ongoing relation to others, and 
that there could never be any way of apprehending psychic reality which did not involve a 
relationship with an observer. The psychoanalytic method takes specific  account of this 
relation, via the transference and counter-transference. It thus becomes an explicit dimension  
of  the  description and explanation of the  phenomena being observed, not an unnoticed 
distortion of what would otherwise be an 'objective' account.   
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in this respect continuous with and not a departure from the properties of the 
physical world.  The patterns of different evolutionary pathways, generating 
‘fitness landscapes’ in which certain species evolve to dominate particular  
niches at the cost of reducing their evolutionary potential to occupy any other 
vacant ecological spaces,  is an example of such systemic, contingent and 
time-irreversible patterns.  (The specialisation of male peacocks in the 
elaboration of plumage for sexual display has for example cut off the potential 
of this species to evolve its  capacities in other prospectively competitive 
attributes such as speed of  flight or invisibility to predators.)   
 
Complexity Theory and Psychoanalysis 
 
Valuables articles by Moran  (1991) Quinodoz (1997) and Miller (1999)   have  
previously  explored the relevance of chaos and complexity theory to 
psychoanalysis. These writers have argued that the domain of psychoanalysis 
is the investigation of the attributes of  self-ordering multi-dimensional 
systems, not of the search for linear causal correlations between specified 
variables. There are a number of respects in which the theoretical framework 
generated within this paradigm provides a better fit with the models of the 
mind which psychoanalysis produces than theories which presuppose linear 
determinism. The idea of ‘phase changes’  between different states of 
equilibrium, which may be triggered unpredictably by contingencies, and 
which involve bifurcated developments  between alternative patterns of order, 
meshes well with contemporary psychoanalytic theory.  The concept of 
‘strange attractors’ as the organising principles of  coherent configurations of 
mind seems also to be  a potent one, in the view of these writers.   
 
Thus,  chaos theory or complexity theory seem to offer an invaluable means 
of escape from the unsatisfactory choice  which psychoanalysis has long 
seemed to face,  between ‘causal’ and deterministic models on the one hand, 
derived from Freud’s aspirations to scientificity, and ‘hermeneutic’ and 
‘interpretative’ schemas on the other.  The former  recognises   and seeks  
out relations of causality without which psychoanalysis would lack a theory of 
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purposeful change or agency. But causal models of the classical  kind  have 
great difficulties in accounting for the complexity and multidimensionality of 
emotional and thinking processes as the essence of psychic structure and 
process.  To be usefully applicable to mental life, the principle of causality 
needs to be somewhat dissociated from the idea of mechanism and 
determinism.  Hermeneutic approaches on the other hand  have  the 
advantage that they  enable analysts to follow and monitor the systems of 
meaning and intention, conscious and unconscious, which constitute the 
mental activities of their subjects. These models recognise complexity and 
ambiguity as essential attributes of mind, and can take account of the ways in 
which changes in mental process and function take place in ways which are 
only partially constrained by, or logically inferable from, previous structures of 
meaning. They  allow for the emergent properties of the mind, and for the 
many unforeseeable connections which it makes, even if a principled 
disavowal of causality rules out too much.  Devoted to the explication of 
meanings as it must be, psychoanalysis also  needs a  conception of the 
constraining powers of structures of mind, and of the  causal efficacy of  the 
analytic process in bringing about  specifiable changes in the structures of the 
mind. It would be gravely impoverished without these.  
 
What complexity theory suggests is that we can transcend this unwelcome 
dichotomy between causal reductionism on the one hand, and a merely 
interpretative investigation of narratives on the other.  It suggests that we 
should be looking for order and coherence in a different place, neither in the 
spheres of intention and meaning alone, nor in the sphere of deterministic 
structures or ‘mechanisms’ as they have sometimes  been metaphorically 
called.   Instead, this emergent paradigm suggests, we should be looking for 
ordering patterns of psychic coherence,  functioning within specified 
parameters, and for sometimes sudden changes in state, often of a binary or 
bifurcated kind, triggered or catalysed by external or internal factors.  
Quinodoz utilises  the idea of ‘tuning variables’ derived from chaos theory to 
explain how multi-dimensional systems can evolve in response to specific 
factors. He suggests that the intensity of a ‘containing relationship’ between 
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infant and parents, or the intensity of a transference relationship within a 
personal analysis,  can function as ‘tuning variables’ enabling development to 
take place along a continuum, or rather by means of step-jumps, from modes 
of mental functioning with fewer ‘dimensions’ to those with more.  
British psychoanalytic thinking post-Bion has  given a lot of importance to 
‘three dimensionality’ as a criterion of psychic development. In recent work, 
for example by Britton,  the resolution of Oedipal anxiety into the acceptance 
of three (or more) person relationships has been defined as a key index of 
psychic growth.  But in reflecting on the nature of autism and post-autistic 
states and in seeking to understand the development of severely deprived 
children this tradition has also attached importance to the  incorporation of the 
realities of time, space and causality into the understandings of the mind, as  
preconditions for  its development. The reflexive recognition of ‘inner’ mental 
space, in the self and in others, is a third aspect of dimensionality which is 
now given importance in the psychoanalytic theory of development. 
Whilst containing relationships can be understood as ‘benign’ tuning 
variables, we can conversely view high levels of anxiety or deprivation as 
‘negative’ tuning variables. Where the former may support phase transitions 
from paranoid-schizoid to depressive modes of function  (which as Quinodoz 
points out involves a move from fewer to more dimensions of complexity), the 
latter may induce shifts back towards the paranoid-schizoid end of the 
spectrum, with its simplified binary ordering of good and bad by mechanisms 
of splitting. Such high levels of psychic anxiety may be produced in 
populations by civil conflicts or by sudden economic insecurities, and may in 
their turn give rise to persecutory kinds of behaviour.  
An obvious convergence between  chaos and complexity theory and 
psychoanalysis lies in Bion’s concept of catastrophic change. Within the 
terms of complexity theory, we can say that Bion’s concept describes ‘phase 
changes’ from one state of psychic order to another potential state, providing 
a powerful example of the ideas of disequilibrium and  changes in phase-
space  which achieved their broader currency through public dissemination of 
chaos theory and complexity considerably later.  Bion’s attention seems to 
have been drawn to Poincaré around the same time as the mathematicians 
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who were developing chaos theory were beginning their work, but well before 
this became widely known.  The interest of complexity theorists in the critical 
importance of the ‘edge of chaos’ as a state from which development and 
complexity arises is closely parallel to the importance and necessity of 
‘catastrophic change’ in Bion’s view of the mind. 9  
Recent developments in the theory of transitions and oscillations between 
paranoid-schizoid, borderline and depressive modes of functioning appear to 
be usefully framed within these notions of complex forms of order and 
evolution. Britton’s (1998) recent theorisations of movements and oscillations 
between successive constellations of paranoid-schizoid and depressive 
functioning, each reorganising and re-framing the phenomenological contents 
of the temporally preceding phase in new ways, is valuable in its introduction 
of a temporal dimension into the idea of psychic development. One might say 
that the implicit aspiration of classical Kleinian theory was to devise models of 
the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions which were in principle ‘time-
reversible.’  They were, that is to say, such logically consistent and closed 
models that it would be possible to imagine a mind ordered either by the one 
principle of organisation or the other, and moving backwards and forwards 
between them rather as one can imagine a change of physical state from 
liquid to gaseous and back again. What Bion’s and subsequently Britton’s 
formulations do is to add to this account a necessarily temporal dimension,  
acknowledging that  each ‘cycle’ of oscillations may and indeed must  be 
different from its predecessor in that it  has to incorporate and process the 
psychic experiences of the previous stage.  At least, in a developing mind this 
will happen; no doubt there are many clinical instances where there appears 
to be disappointingly little development, either out of the paranoid-schizoid 
position or even within  each oscillation between paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive modes. But Britton’s discussion of the life and work of a number of 
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 Another framing of  these issues, termed 'catastrophe theory', arose from the work of the 
French mathematician René Thom (1975).  This also gave rise to a research programme with 
many  applications (Woodcock and Davis 1980, Zeeman  1977), but seems to have run out of 
steam . The largely U.S. based programme of development of chaos and complexity theories 
appears to have found greater momentum, and also a great deal of visibility through popular 
scientific writing.    
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major writers (Milton, Blake, Wordsworth and Rilke) shows how this element 
of irreversible evolution can be seen in psychic development whatever its 
ultimate outcome, and can be the primary psychic subject of an artist’s work. 
10
 
Another concept in chaos theory which may have its place in psychoanalytic 
thinking is the idea of the ‘fractal’,11 which  is the idea that the  patterns of 
order which make up complex systems,  bound together by ‘strange 
attractors’, may be found  at all or at least many levels of a system, from the 
micro to the macro, and from elements of short duration to elements which 
persist over time.  The analysis of clinical cases over time may disclose  
movements  between paranoid-schizoid, borderline and depressive states of 
mind,  and the triggering  factors which bring such movements about. Such 
‘state changes’  can be understood by reference to the progress or otherwise 
of a whole process of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, in terms of the 
differences between patients’ states of mind at its beginning and  end. . But 
they may also be related to the meanings of beginnings and endings for 
patients within more circumscribed time-intervals within a process of 
psychotherapy, whether these intervals be bounded by holidays, by weekend 
breaks,  or by the beginning and end of a single session. The idea is that 
what is constituted by a ‘paranoid-schizoid’ or ‘depressive’ form of psychic 
organisation can be identified at each of these different levels and scales. It is 
in this  sense  a ‘fractal’, an organising pattern which manifests itself ‘all the 
way down’  within a psychoanalytic process, and in the patterns of mind of a 
patient which this illuminates.   
Why should there be ‘strange attractors’, systemic forms of organisation, and 
irreversible evolutionary patterns, in the psychic organisations theorised by 
psychoanalysis?  In fact, theory  is psychoanalysis is largely organised around 
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  There are other  links to time which are important in psychotherapeutic work.  One  is the 
discovery that  psychic  damage and trauma can be transmitted across a generation to  
children, even when individuals in the parental (or grandparental) generation who were directly 
traumatised seem themselves to have survived. Selma Fraiberg's (Fraiberg et al 1975)  
concept of the 'ghost in the nursery' is one of the most influential formulations of this idea.  
Another,  more benign instance is the ''sleeper effect'  described by Israel Kolvin - the 
evidence that long-term benefit may be obtained from psychoanalytic psychotherapy even 
when its short-term effects seem to have been small. (Kolvin et al 1988, Bell et al. 1989)  
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such models. Freud’s ‘stage’ model of oral, anal and genital development was 
one early version of these. The Kleinian binary model of the paranoid-schizoid 
and the depressive  positions, is another, to which has more recently been 
added a third intermediary term, borderline states. Freud’s classifications of 
neurotic pathology,  Kleinian descriptions of oscillations between loving and 
destructive states of mind,  and Rosenfeld’s and Meltzer’s related  models of 
narcissistic character structure are among the  many examples one could give 
of such systemic structures, or  ‘organisations’, as Steiner (1993) explicitly 
calls them in referring to ‘pathological organisations’.   
Such models might have emerged merely in  response to the subjective and 
heuristic need for coherence and simplification of complexity of practising 
analysts, rather than as reflections of the objective properties of their human 
subjects, but this seems unlikely.  The reason why we posit a finite number of 
clearly defined ‘ideal types’ of psychic organisation, rather than assuming that 
psychic characteristics are evenly distributed along  continua with no special 
clustering around ‘extreme’ or ‘pure’ types’, is more likely to be  because this 
is an accurate representation of psychic realities.  (Gell-Mann discusses 
‘power laws’ which map various kinds of naturally occurring distributions 
which suggest that regularities are a property of nature, not merely 
impositions by our own cognitive apparatus.)  But if this is so in respect of 
psychic life, what are the ordering principles or ‘strange attractors’ which 
make it so? 
A functional need for coherence of perception and psychic organisation, to 
simplify and make manageable the task of processing experience and making 
judgements about the world (in particular the world of other human beings)  is 
what seems to explain the persistence of distinct patterns of psychic 
organisation. Symptoms, as Freud and many others have pointed out,  are 
effective in concentrating anxiety on specific objects. They may displace 
anxieties from their  ‘real’ objects, to other spheres where unconscious fears, 
though paralysing, are nevertheless contained by the symptom in some way. 
Paranoid-schizoid ways of viewing the world  define the good and the bad in 
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(1977, rev. 1983). See also Stewart (1989).  
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unambiguous terms, and eliminate confusing uncertainty and doubt. Fight-
flight can be  a viable strategy of self-defence, which is why individuals and 
communities default to it when anxiety levels become high. Depressive 
anxieties, which involve recognition of the existence of the other, and concern 
for their-well-being,  demand the toleration of more complex realities, and a 
measure of trust in the environment as not wholly retaliatory.  
This ‘depressive’ structure requires support both from external and internal 
realities, and where these are lacking or weakened, it will collapse.12 We can 
think of the perception of external risk, and the susceptibility to internally-
generated anxieties, as different kinds of (interacting) ‘strange attractors’ in 
forming paranoid-schizoid structures of mind.  It is the need to contain  
anxiety in some definite and unambiguous form which seems to be the 
common principle which determines that  psychic organisations tend towards 
coherence, and bifurcate around different forms of coherence.  Another way 
of putting this is to say that the coherence which analysts need to make 
sense of their task is also a functional need of their subjects, and indeed of all 
human mentality. This ‘strange attractor’, the principle of psychic coherence 
itself, is a universal, a kind of internal psychic gravitation or frictional drag, 
ensuring that psychic systems move in step-jumps from one form of 
equilibrium to another, and that their elements are rarely arrayed in random 
disorder.13  
The conceptions of  an immanent tendency to order  which are found within 
psychoanalysis are  congruent with the more generalised conceptions of  
complexity and chaos theory. What is more astonishing, however, is the 
explicit anticipation of these ideas in the work of Bion, twenty years before the 
publication of most of the key modern writings in this field.   In ‘Learning from 
Experience’, (1963)   Bion quotes at length from Henri Poincaré (1854-1912), 
                                            
12
 Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson's (2000)  work on citizens'  fear of crime valuably 
demonstrated that 'internal' realities (unconscious anxieties) were important in determining the 
extent of fear, independently of the external 'statistical' risks to which individuals were subject. 
13
 Nor is random disorder as common a feature of physical nature as might be supposed.  For 
example, pebbles on the beach, which one might think of as randomly located, are in fact 
sorted by the waves and tides according to their weight and volume, and are smoothed into 
rounded shapes by the force of friction.   
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the mathematician who is now widely regarded as the originator of complexity 
theory:    
H. Poincaré  describes the process of creation of a mathematical formulation 
thus: 
‘If  a new result is to have any value. It must unite elements long since known, 
but till then scattered and seemingly foreign to each other, and suddenly 
introduce order where the appearance of disorder reigned. Then it enables us 
to see at a glance each of these elements in the place it occupies as a whole. 
Not only is the new fact valuable on its own account, but it alone gives value 
to the old facts it unites. Our mind is as frail as our senses are; it would lose 
itself in the complexity of the world if that complexity were not harmonious; 
like the short-sighted, it would only see the details, and would be obliged to 
forget each of these details before examining the next, because it would be 
incapable of taking in the whole. The only facts worthy of our attention are 
those which introduce order into this complexity and so make it accessible to 
us.’ 14   
Bion  derives his concept of the ‘selected fact’ from  Poincaré’s  insight. Bion 
put it thus: 
I have used the term ‘selected fact’ to describe that which the psycho-analyst 
must experience in the process of synthesis. The name of one element is 
used to particularise the selected fact, that is to say the name of that element 
in the realisation which appears to link together elements not hitherto seen to 
be connected... The selected fact is the name of an emotional experience, the 
emotional experience of a sense of discovery of coherence. 
                                             Learning from Experience (chapter 23, p. 72)      
          
Bion is here arguing for the primacy of experience of psychic reality over 
deductive law-like formulations, arguing that the latter can only be made once 
links have been made in the mind (‘epistemological’ links) between 
experienced phenomena. He suggests that Poincaré’s description of  finding 
                                            
14
  H. Poincaré. (1952)   Science and  Method. (Originally published in France in 1908).  
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harmonious order in complexity ‘closely resembles the psycho-analytical 
theory of paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions adumbrated by Mrs 
Klein.’   
 
This text of Bion was of course central to his own reorientation of 
psychoanalysis towards the primacy within it of  imaginative experience, 
which he said called for  ‘negative capability’ (Keats)   as the precondition of 
understanding.  Meltzer’s subsequent characterisations of the aesthetic   
aspects of mental function  developed from this idea.   Bion of course also  
remained committed to the relevance of logical deductive systems and 
categorisations. However he thought that these followed from a prior 
‘emotional experience’ of finding coherence in disordered and fragmented 
states, and could not precede it.  His concept of catastrophic change, as we 
have said, directly mirrors the concepts of  changes of state which are 
elaborated within chaos theory, and are there given mathematical 
formulations which seem unlikely to be achievable within the ‘open systems’ 
of the mind.   
 
It is noteworthy that the mathematical aspirations of Bion’s work which 
probably aroused most scepticism among many psychoanalysts, and have 
been most difficult for them to follow  up, were in fact responsible for his 
anticipation of this new and valuable framing of scientific understanding. 
Psychoanalysis has been sustained throughout by such links (sometimes like 
this one unexpected ones) with different fields of inquiry. Indeed such 
conjunctions may embody the kind of creative catastrophic change which 
Bion’s psychoanalytic theory predicts and prescribes as essential to 
development.   
 
Bion’s  concept of ‘selected fact’  was later taken up by  Edna O’Shaugnessy 
and other analysts15 in the elaboration of the idea of the specifically ‘clinical 
                                                                                                                             
 
15
 See the special 75th  Anniversary Issue (Vol. 75, 1994)  of the International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis on 'The Conceptualisation and Communication of Clinical Facts in 
Psychoanalysis.' 
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fact’ of the psychoanalytic session. This, in O’Shaugnessy’s paper (1994), 
refers to a perception of the reality of the transference relationship at a given 
moment which can be successfully communicated to the patient.  When a 
clinical fact has been correctly apprehended, It is  not only the analyst, but 
also the analysand, who has this experience of perceiving an unexpected 
coherence and meaning. This possibility of shared understanding  is of 
course essential to the psychoanalytic process, and develops Strachey’s 
(1934)  earlier idea of  ‘mutative interpretation’.  This is one aspect of the way 
in which  Bion’s early anticipation of the insights of complexity theory has  
informed contemporary psychoanalytic thinking.16  
 
 
The Relevance of Complexity Theory to Infant Observation. 
 
What the above argument suggests is that researchers in psychoanalytic 
infant observation should be looking primarily not for causal correlations or 
sequences of linear development, but for ordering patterns, for the evidence 
of emergent systemic organisation in the minds of infants and in the 
relationships between infants and those around them.  There may be a good 
fit between the  frame of inquiry set out by complexity theory, and the 
procedures and techniques of ‘naturalistic’ infant observation, just as there 
has been shown to be  such a fit with the procedures of clinical research.  
What characterises infant observation  is a holistic approach, an  open-
mindedness in regard to internal and external aspects of the experience of 
infants and their families,  and  an interest in mapping changes and 
development over time, which is expressed in its predominantly  narrative, 
case-study approach. What may be captured through these methods is a  
recognition of multi-dimensional patterns of organisation (for example, the 
effects of a supportive or non-supportive presence of grandparents, or of a 
                                            
16
 There is a reflexive aspect to the apparent correspondence between the theoretical self-
organising systems posited in modern psychoanalytic theory  (the 'pathological organisations' 
of Steiner, for example) and complexity theory. On the one hand, psychic structures do have 
this character.  On the other hand, those psychic structures which have been categorised and 
defined in post-Kleinian psychoanalysis in particular have been deeply influenced by a 
psychoanalyst, namely Bion, who grasped the essence of chaos and complexity before this 
paradigm acquired a name, and have thus already been shaped by this way of thinking.  
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persecuting or benign internal mother);  the identification of discrete ‘changes 
of state’ or shifts of equilibria, sometimes through an observed crisis in 
relationships or in the  observational setting; or the role of ‘tuning variables’ of 
a benign form of containment, or its absence, in the psychic development of 
the infant. Researchers in infant observation need to clarify and systematise 
both the  ‘structures’ and ‘patterns’ which can be established as norms for 
their observations, and the observable ‘indicators’ which tell them about the 
existence or  strength of such a pattern.    
 
Much of the literature on psychoanalytic infant observation  describes exactly  
these forms of discovery.  One of the innate principles of complexity theory, 
namely the idea that there is an inherent tendency to order in apparently 
random phenomena,  is fundamental to Bick’s approach to the mind of the 
infant. She posited  a need for the binding together of the self and its bodily 
and mental experiences as a primordial psychic fact. The principal  function of 
maternal containment is to support this sense of coherence, and to protect 
the infant against anxieties of ‘falling to pieces’.  Bick’s most important 
substantive discovery, her theory of the ‘Second Skin’ (1968), has this 
primordial anxiety as its backdrop:  
 
The thesis is that in its most primitive form the parts of the personality are felt 
to have no binding force amongst themselves and must therefore be held 
together in such a way that it is experienced by them passively, by the skin 
functioning as a boundary.  But this  internal function of containing the parts 
of the self depends initially on the introjection of an external object, capable of 
fulfilling this function. Later, identification with this function of the object 
supersedes the unintegrated state, and gives rise to the fantasy of internal 
and external spaces.  
 
Bick went on to describe how  
 
The need for a containing object would seem, in the infantile unintegrated 
state, to produce a frantic search for an object - a light, a voice, a smell, or 
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other sensual object - which can hold the attention and thereby be 
experienced, momentarily at least, as holding the parts of the personality 
together. The optimal object is the nipple in the mouth, together with the 
holding and talking and familiar smelling mother. Material will show how this 
containing object is experienced concretely as a skin. Faculty development of 
the primal skin function can be seen to result either from defects in the 
adequacy of the actual object, or from fantasy attacks on it, which impair 
introjection.   Disturbance in the primal skin function can lead to the 
development of a ‘second skin’ formation through which dependence on the 
object is replaced by a pseudo-independence, by the inappropriate use of 
certain mental functions, or perhaps innate talents, for the purpose of creating 
a substitute for this skin container function.’  
 
In one of the seminal psychoanalytic contributions to the infant’s psychic 
development, she defined this,  drawing on infant observational case 
examples, as the ‘second skin’ formation.  (Bick 1968).  
 
In her essay Notes on Infant Observation in Psychoanalytic Training (1964)  
Bick   makes frequent to the ‘patterns  of behaviour’  which are discerned by 
observers in  infants. She describes these patterns in very concrete terms  -  
for example, the different gestures of a  baby’s hands in relation to its 
mother’s two breasts -  and offers  many conjectures on what these may 
signify in terms of psychic development.  For example in that  case these 
different gestures suggest a kind of incipient splitting.  The idea that ‘patterns’ 
are  what one should be looking for, whether in the minutiae of physical 
movements, or in a broader  mind-body  configuration such as that of the 
‘Second Skin’,  is an example of the kind of structure which  one might expect 
to find in open self-organising systems,  especially but not exclusively in living 
forms, and in human subjects in particular.17   
 
 
                                            
17
 Once again, the convergence of Bick's ideas with the underlying conceptions of complexity 
theory, and with the ideas of Bion which anticipate these, was only to be expected.  Bick refers 
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Many of the most fertile insights of infant observation research to date are of 
this kind.  To the example of Bick’s papers,  one could add many others, 
including Juliet Hopkins’ (1996)  article  on the pattern and consequences for 
development of ‘too-good mothering,’  and  the work of Sue Reid (1997) on 
observed  patterns of mother-infant interaction that seem  conducive to the 
development of autism.  Another recent example of the identification of a 
‘pattern’ of this kind is in Pamela  Sorensen’s (2000) paper ‘Observations on 
transition facilitating behaviour -  developmental and theoretical implications’.  
This paper, which seeks to establish a bridge between attachment and object 
relations theories,  clarifies the importance of everyday transitions for all 
babies,  from observations of the experiences of exceptionally vulnerable 
infants in a Neo-Natal Intensive Care Unit.  The exploration and elaboration of 
different forms of containment has become one of the principal areas of infant 
observational research ( Briggs 1997).   Along with a developing capacity to 
discriminate different patterns of containment, including those involving 
severe deficits or disturbances, have come the beginnings of  purposefully 
‘therapeutic’ infant observations, where some measure of deliberate 
intervention takes place. This  reflects a greater confidence in the ability of 
observers to understand from an early stage what is going on in an infant’s 
relations to those close to him.   But as in psychotherapy itself, the possibility 
of testing the outcome of interventions is likely to provide an additional 
resource for the development of new understandings and concepts. 
Once  theoretical classifications have become established as stable points of 
reference,  they become capable of further differentiation, even ‘bifurcation’ to 
use the terminology of complexity theory,  (as in the differentiation by 
Rosenfeld between  libidinal and destructive narcissism). It is in this way that 
the  adequacy and complexity of the theoretical models available for 
researchers can  develop  as they conduct  observations. 
The assumption of complexity theory that realities are complex, emergent, 
non-reversible over time,  and liable to generate increased difference, is 
consistent with both the scientific and humanistic assumptions of 
                                                                                                                             
to 'situations conducive to catastrophic anxieties in the unintegrated  state' in her Second Skin 
paper of 1968, indicating her closeness to Bion's thinking at that time. 
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psychoanalysis.  Humanistic assumptions because psychoanalysis is 
committed to the inherent value of autonomy, difference, and choice - it wants 
its subjects to be understood and to understand themselves in their 
particularity, not merely as an instance of a diagnostic category. And scientific 
because the theoretical models of psychoanalysis have never been intended 
to do more than define  the boundary conditions of different kind of mental 
and emotional life, within  and between which much variation is both 
anticipated  and desired.  
The specific focus of psychoanalytic infant observation, conducted in natural 
settings, contrasts with the investigations of infant development undertaken 
within the ‘attachment theory’ perspective, though their findings are in some 
respects  mutually supportive. Attachment theory  is wedded to a more 
classical scientific model, being committed to the identification of definite 
causal patterns or models of attachment and its preconditions. These  models 
do  capture some important boundary conditions which determine the 
capacity for relationships and well-being. In doing so, they identify temporal 
and relational spaces where developmental vulnerability lies, and in which 
preventive interventions are feasible and desirable.  But these approaches 
seem to have stopped short  of much further differentiation, once they had  
established  their basic array of framing conditions. (Three  main kinds of 
attachment - securely-attached, anxious attached avoidant, anxious attached 
ambivalent/resistant,  were discovered by Mary Ainsworth (Ainsworth et al. 
1978) , and a fourth - the disorganised/disoriented was subsequently and 
valuably added by Mary Main. (Main and Solomon 1986, Main and Hesse 
1990).   This experimental methodology seems to have only   limited 
conceptual resources with which to map differences between individuals, or 
their patterns of psychological development.18  We could say, following Gell-
Mann’s  term for broader interpretative schema, that these models are 
‘coarse-grained’ simplifications of realities which psychoanalysis and 
psychoanalytic infant observation seek to investigate in more ‘fine-grained’ 
                                            
18
 Peter Fonagy's comments on the challenges posed by psychoanalysis to attachment theory 
in chapter 13   of his Attachment Theory and Psychoanalysis (2000) are perceptive about their 
differences of approach.   
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ways. The finer the grain of observation, the more that contingencies and 
differences become evide 
t.   
 
The increasing emphasis within the attachment theory tradition on ‘mental 
models and maps’  has  increased the explanatory coherence of its models, 
and brought  it closer to psychoanalysis, in part through  the  incorporation of 
some of Bion’s ideas.  We could  say that the capacity for the mental 
processing of experience is functioning within this paradigm as the ‘strange 
attractor’  which hold its different patterns of attachment together.  But it 
continues to lack the multi-dimensionality of the psychoanalytic theory of 
personality development. Psychoanalysis,  it will be remembered, takes 
account of the dimensions  contributed by predispositions to love and hate, as 
well as by the capacity for understanding, and by the role of unconscious 
representations and memories internalised as phantasies of self and others. It 
seeks to investigate in its fine-grained way  the idiosyncratic ‘scripts’, both 
conscious and unconscious, which evolve as means of dealing with 
emotionally-charged realities.  
 
There is a natural continuum and complementarity between  fine- and coarse-
grained forms of explanation, and between the more conjectural and complex 
forms of explanation which go with the first, and the more definite and 
categorical  causal explanations which go with the second.  One can say 
therefore that both clinical and observational psychoanalytic approaches, and 
protocol-driven and laboratory-based attachment theory procedures, have 
their necessary and distinct place in the investigation of infant development. 
(Rustin 2001a).  
 
What about the role of causality  within these different models?  Should 
psychoanalysis, and infant observation research in  particular, be seeking to 
establish causal laws, or not? In what way, if any, does the contribution of 
complexity theory resolve the antithesis between ‘interpretative’ and ‘causal’ 
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models of explanation which we posited at the outset as a long-standing 
dilemma for psychoanalysis? 
 
The identification of ‘patterns’, ‘self-organising systems’, and ‘strange 
attractors’ within complexity theory substitutes complex and holistic notions of 
causal relation for the ‘linear’ models  aspired to by many mechanistic 
sciences, including much of psychology.  Complexity theory, and its 
applications within psychoanalysis, identifies ‘fields of force’ which bind 
psychic phenomena, and which create or constitute  dispositions  for subjects 
to act according to discernible  patterns.  The paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive positions are examples of  dispositions of this kind. These  are 
‘generative structures’, to use another terminology,19 with many connected 
dimensions.  Their value for psychoanalysts,  whether as clinicians or 
researchers, is not as predictors of specific acts,  but as binding conceptions 
which specify tendencies or dispositions with many connected dimensions, for 
example of thought, feeling, and behaviour.  It is possible to identify typical  
causal connections within these theoretical schema, and to find ways of 
accurately measuring the incidence of these.  (Bick for example suggested 
that certain kinds of deficient containment would lead to defences of pseudo-
independent ‘muscularity’; there is no reason to think that this could not be 
treated as a definite hypothesis and specifically tested against evidence.) But 
the interest and value of these models lies in their capacity to give definition 
to many differentiated kinds of pattern, as these appear in observational or 
clinical settings. This is why its preferred style of thinking is in terms of  multi-
dimensional narratives, rather than  by the correlation of discrete variables.   
These models are not well adapted  to demonstrating specific linear causal 
                                            
19
  The concept of 'generative structures' derives from Roy Bhaskar's realist theory of science 
(Bhaskar 1975).  According this view, theories identify and model structures which are 
manifested primarily through their observable effects. Scientific inquiry therefore involves not 
only making empirical observations, and finding correlations between them, but also making 
inferences from observed data to underlying structures and mechanisms.  Reviews of this 
approach  in relation to psychoanalysis are in  Will (1980, 1986) and Rustin (1991b). 
Psychoanalysis is distinctive in its assumption that surface manifestations of consciousness 
and behaviour are derived causally from  structures of mind which are held to be effective at 
'deep'  levels of the mind, and whose existence and power has to be inferred from the 
'surface' phenomena of consciousness.  Freud's theory of repression  explained why these 
structures remained largely 'unconscious' . The idea of 'mechanism' becomes important in  
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effects  between identified variables, such as evidence-based policy might 
wish to see.  But they are powerful in identifying more holistic patterns of 
behaviour, and their antecedents and effects, and enabling skilled therapists 
to identify within these patterns areas in which change and development is 
possible.20   
  
Psychoanalysis is antithetical in this respect to attachment theory, which gives 
much higher priority to the simplifications and generalisations necessary to 
establish robust causal connections (which of course it has done with   
success).  The value of complexity theory for psychoanalysis is that it 
provides a much more adequate meta-framework for its ways of thinking than 
the mechanistic models that have earlier dominated the sciences.  There is a 
large domain of nature, it suggests, that is neither determined in the manner 
of a closed mechanism or system, nor wholly random, indeterminate, or ‘free’.   
Instead, it posits self-organising systems, of high complexity, and  
indeterminacy within understood limits. Precisely, in fact,  the world  of 
experience with which clinical psychoanalysts continually struggle, and which 
observers encounter on a weekly basis in their visits to infants and their 
families. 
 
In the last forty years, since the publication of T.S. Kuhn’s Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions,  (1962)  the recognition of the actual diversity and 
complexity of the sciences has made it easier for psychoanalysts to locate 
their work as having a place within a  larger scientific community, its methods 
seeming less anomalous once they are understood as appropriate to their  
                                                                                                                             
psychoanalytic  discourse through Anna Freud's theory (A. Freud 1936) of mechanisms of 
defence.  
20
  Another model of explanation which is relevant here is the  'part-whole' analysis which is 
advocated by Thomas Scheff (1997) as often most appropriate in the human sciences.  
Where self-maintaining systems exist  - for example in biological organisms, or in social 
organisations or processes - the most useful form of explanation may be to clarify the relation 
of specific phenomena to the larger structure and process of which they form part. 
'Catastrophic changes' from one  pattern of systemic coherence to another  create new part-
whole relations, which then become a matter for investigation. Psychoanalytic interpretation 
often looks for connections of this kind.  On the part-whole analysis of narrative texts, see 
Wengraf (2001)).     
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specific topics of study.21 It seems likely that ‘Complexity Theory’ offers a 
further illumination of this kind.   It turns out that  complexity, emergent 
properties, susceptibility to phase-transitions (‘catastrophic change’, in Bion’s  
terms, (1965, 1970),  individual difference, and ubiquitous contingency, may 
be normal facts of mental life, not merely  the imprecise  reflections of the  
inadequate scientific method of  psychoanalysis.  Not only are these complex 
and seemingly chaotic structures characteristic  of the  psychic realities which 
psychoanalysis investigates, but they seem now to have been found to be the 
attributes of a good part of biological and material nature besides. 
 
-end- 
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